Organizing for Endangered and Threatened Species Habitat

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? ? ? 0 - rationality to trade away the things that they do not want in order to obtain things they do. There - is no need to get organized with a whole community to buy and use a pocket comb or a tractor. ? 2. Collective (public) property/resources (See Figure 1) have exactly the opposite attributes as ? cornpared to private property/resources. They are characterized by zero rivalness and - excludability. A given quantity of water flow contributing to quality plover habitat is a public property resource. Markets do not emerge to provide these because the benefits that can be ? captured by an individual investor can be no greater than those available to non-investors (free ? riders). Healthy ecosystems capable of sustaining species listed under the Endangered Species - Act, in the absence of public 1' d ff ' Private Rivalness high, Excludability high Investor Benefits b. Common Rivalness moderate, Excludability moderate Investor Benefit c. Collective Rivalness zero, Excludability zero Investor Benefits Figure 1 Types of Property po icy an e echve organuzations to prevent private rationality from dominating the situation, will be degraded by people who in the course of pursuing private rationality in marketplaces simply exploit open access to the common heritage for private gain. In an open access situation, one has to be a fool or major altruist to invest in things the benefits of which will escape away and cannot be denied to non-investors. Examples of collective or public include national defense, flood control, police and fire protection, forest and watershed protection and, of course, provision of high quality habitat for birds and fish on the central Platte river. 3. Common property (See Figure 1) is characterized by moderate rivalness and excludability. For example, a given quantity of water flowing though an irrigation canal to a farmer's field represents a resowce that is moderately rival and excludable. It is rival in the sense that a delivery to one fartner cannot then be simultaneously delivered to the next irrigator. However, an important fraction of the water delivered to the first user will run off as ta.il water or percolate into soils and otherwise rnove downslope to provide "return flows" to other users who thereby also share benefits. Given leaky earthen ditches and modest field application efficiencies, a substantial fraction of one user's water will flow to others in the irrigation community and the others cannot be totally