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January 20086, Notes to accompany presentations and posters <br />SUGGESTED PRINCIPLES FOR WATER TRANSFER INSTITUTION DESIGN - <br />Avoiding unintended consequences and creating participation to provide certainty <br />1. Role of the State "Referee" for technical and administrative management, to protect property rights including but not <br />limited to water rights. Defends interests in water quality, soil erosion etc., social impacts as directed, future conditions, and <br />compliance with federal law and interstate compacts. Provides adequate information and institutions to allow successful <br />markets and reduce transactions costs. Provides assurance of certainty of priority. Fosters capacity of local governments to <br />identify and secure needs and interests, usually within markets. <br />2. Role of the Market Fair and reasonably transparent opportunity for trades of resources and arrangements for risk <br />distribution and management. Opportunity for third-parties and governments to seek or preserve conditions they desire, for <br />amenity, tax-related, recreational, environmental or other interests, by purchase, lease, easement or otherwise. Market <br />allocation is preferred to political processes because it allows negotiation flexibility for unique needs and desires, and certainty <br />of property rights. Use the market when adequately supported. <br />3. Certainty is an Essential Purpose Creation of successful alternatives to sale of water rights requires correct specification <br />of property interests, and provisions for adjustment of deals, and adequate efforts to foresee and manage impacts and surprises. <br />Impacts on transferor areas include regional and cumulative impacts, such as total changes in employment, habitats, species, <br />salinity and flow impacts. Failure to anticipate thresholds and limits will threaten certainty. Therefore, the scales of impact <br />analysis and the quality of assessment must be sufficient to anticipate adverse surprises which would remove incentives to <br />avoid water rights sales. If the new program is launched without adequate efforts to provide certainty, surprises will favor <br />some interests over others, and may deny achievement of the policy goals. <br />4. Allocation Within Thresholds is Important Failure to anticipate thresholds has been illustrated in the South Platte and <br />Arkansas Basins where well users were abruptly brought into compliance with prior appropriation and in some cases taken out <br />of business. (Abrupt adjustment is also underway in the Republican River area). However a limit or threshold arises, from <br />water law, endangered species, a TMDL, or intent to retain some level of agricultural activity, there will be need to allocate <br />within the limit. Parties hoping to join a market who discover that all permits or all capacities are taken may threaten the <br />legitimacy and certainty of arrangements privately made which suddenly prevent other participation. And, reallocation may be <br />important in the future. <br />5. Transferor "Internal" Allocation by Market Within transferor organizations, two sets of adjustments should be possible <br />using market processes. First, resource re-allocation for public purposes, such as salinity reduction, or purchase of <br />environmental conditions may be important. Second, individual situations may call for flexibility within transferor <br />organizations such as mutual ditch companies. Farms and families may want different outcomes and things change. Certainty <br />in the long term requires internal adjustability on the small scale, and proper scale to accommodate individual property rights <br />and preferences while avoiding organizational crisis. <br />6. Scale Matters: Appropriate Collaborative Institutions Impacts are related to scale, and cumulative impacts are often <br />regional. Identification of impacts and interests is somewhat new in relation to water transfers, partly because of the history of <br />mitigation problems. New transfer mechanisms may need formal collaborative organization (co-ops? districts? ditch <br />companies?) to manage impact assessment and allocate within self-organized areas. There may also be need for regional <br />recreational and environmental consideration, to represent interests new to the market and identify opportunities for <br />coordination and efficiency. Enabling wider participation using markets should more fairly match costs and benefits. Scale <br />issues include areal extent of transferor organization, regional impacts and participant preferences, as well as costs of <br />management and organization. <br />