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<br />2. The Water Crisis in Panama <br /> <br />r <br /> <br />r <br /> <br />During the eleven months, from October 1982 through <br />August 1983, unprecedented drought prevailed over a <br />large area of Central America and the Caribbean Sea. <br />Recent studies have suggested a connection between <br />the drought and anomalies in the Southern Oscillation <br />(a seesaw of atmospheric pressure between thE~ Indian <br />Ocean and the southwest Pacific) and occurrence of <br />"EI Nino", the invasion of warm equatorial water into <br />the domain of the Humboldt Current off Peru and <br />Ecuador. For the Panama Canal and Panama City, this <br />widespread drought caused the most severe water <br />crisis since the canal began operation in 1914. <br /> <br />Normally, the rainy season months of October and <br />November leave Gatun and Madden Lake with plenty <br />of water to keep the canal in full operation through the <br />winter dry season until the normal start of the next <br />rainy season about mid-April. The water is used to fill <br />the locks as ships pass through. Water drawn from <br />Madden Lake, besides providing the municipal supply <br />for Panama City, generates hydroelectric power as it is <br />discharged into Gatun Lake to maintain the wat'2r level <br />there. When Gatun Lake has more water than needed <br />for the locks, hydropower is generated at Gatun Dam. <br /> <br />The winter dry season of 1982-83 began very early, in <br />mid-October, and did not break until early May (:fig, 1). <br />Furthermore, the dry season was exceptionally severe. <br />November, December, and February set new records <br />for dryness; January was the third driest on record, and <br />March the second driest. The 6-month span, November <br />through April, was the driest on record, with only 43 <br />percent of normal rainfall compared with 45 percent for <br />the previous driest in 1976-77. As conditions worsened <br />and it became likely that the level of Gatun Lake would <br />continue falling, the Panama Canal Commission had to <br />advise shippers well in advance that restrictions would <br />be placed on the draft of ships passing throu!~h the <br />canal. Eventually the lake fell so low that draft had to be <br />reduced to 3.5 feet less than normal. The consequence <br />was a severe immediate loss of operating income and <br />the prospect of future loss of business if shippers were <br />to shift permanently to other routes. Added to this <br />concern was the loss of hydroelectric generation and <br />the need to buy power elsewhere. <br /> <br />The drought likewise affected the ability of the Instituto <br />de Recursos Hidraulicos y Electrificacion (lRHE) to <br />su.pply electrical power to Panama City. This primarily <br />comes from a hydroelectric plant at Lake Bayano, <br />about 40 miles east of the city. As the level of this lake <br />fell, rotating brownouts were instituted as a conser- <br />vation measure. <br /> <br />On the occasion of the previous worst drought, in 1977, <br />tl1<2 Panama Canal Commission had given consideration <br />to rainfall stimulation but rejected it because of doubts <br />expressed about its safety and effectiveness. This time, <br />as the crisis mounted, the Chairman of the Commis- <br />sion asked for advice from the U.S. Department of the <br />Interior, Bureau of Reclamation in Denver, Colorado, <br />whose Division of Atmospheric Resources Research <br />had accumulated nearly 20 years of research exper- <br />ience looking toward useful applications of <br />weather modification to the problems of water re- <br />sources management. Because IRHE (an autonomous <br />agl2ncy of the Republic of Panama) was also concerned, <br />it joined with the Panama Canal Commission in re- <br />questing consultation. <br /> <br />This request for advice brought the immediate dispatch <br />of an experienced weather-modification scientist from <br />the Bureau to Panama. The feasibility of stimulating <br />pnlcipitation under the weather conditions prevailing in <br />Panama was reviewed. Considering that the need for <br />immediate relief and likely benefits outweighed the <br />risks and uncertainties as to the magnitude of a rain <br />stimulation effect, the Panama Canal Commission <br />decided to proceed with the emergency cloud seeding <br />operation. Since all cloud seeding would be done over <br />the territory of the Republic of Panama, and since <br />under Panamanian law, the Ministry of Agriculture was <br />designated as the licensing agency for any cloud <br />seE~ding over this territory, a rapid round of consul- <br />tations took place with representatives of the Ministry <br />of Agriculture and its environmental agencies. Approval <br />was quickly obtained and, within a few days, agreements <br />were signed between the Commission and IRHE, and <br />between the Commission and the Bureau of Reclama- <br />tion, for conducting an immediate rain-stimulation <br />operation. These agreements are reproduced in the <br />appendix portion of this report. <br /> <br />3 <br />