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4 UDENWLR 290 4 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 290 (Cite as: 4 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 290) Page 9 Ultimately, of course, the Commissioners arrived at a delivery obligation by the Upper Basin predicated on a ten-year running average and not contemplated on a one-year minimum delivery obligation. Clearly, the basis for this understanding was the assumption that Congress would approve, at some point, the comprehensive development of regulatory storage throughout the entire basin. Congress did lay this foundation for such development in the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act. III. THE 1928 BOULDER CANYON PROJECT ACT After the representatives of the states and the federal government negotiated the Compact, the Compact needed each of the States' ratification and Congress's consent. State ratification proved to be a challenging undertaking. By 1928, when Congress passed the Boulder Canyon Project Act, [FN591 only four of the seven states had ratified the Compact. [FN601 Arizona was particularly adamant in its opposition to the Compact and refused to ratify. To bypass recalcitrant Arizona, the effectiveness of the Boulder Canyon Project Act was contingent upon California limiting itself to total water consumption from the Colorado River of 4.4 million acre-feet per year ("m.a.f./yr"), and upon ratification of the Compact by any six states, including California. [FN61l California almost immediately passed the California Limitation Act [FN621 and ratified the Compact. Ratification by Utah followed, and the Boulder Canyon Project Act became effective. [FN631 Soon after, in the 1931 California Seven-Party Agreement, [FN64] the major California entities agreed among themselves on the priorities within California. *307 After the Compact negotiation, and pending state ratification and congressional consent, discussions arose over who would build and pay for the monumental works contemplated by the states. Possible candidates included the federal government, irrigators, power customers, or private entities. Additionally, the states worried about their respective jurisdictional responsibilities and the authority of the Federal Power Commission if a private entity constructed a major dam. This debate did serve to make one fact perfectly clear: the construction and operation of any major facility on the Colorado River was too big, and the international and interstate issues too complex, for anyone other than the federal government to undertake. [FN651 The federal government did undertake this responsibility in 1928, when the Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized the construction of the Hoover Dam and the All-American Canal. As&e'states would later see in the United States Supreme 'C6'Uff'deets'foil'TirArizona v. California, {FN6JHthe Boulder Canyon Project Act also represefited a major step by Congress in ili'e:,0tmposidofioffederal authority (albeit with the consent of and in coordination with the states), in the allocation, regUlation, and management ofthe.Colorado River. The Upper Basin interests also pursued their idea of comprehensive storage development. They secured in the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act a provision authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to study and report to Congress, on a comprehensive and coordinated basis, the potential development of water projects throughout the Basin. rFN671 The Depression and World War II delayed the comprehensive study authorized in 1928. Once completed in 1946, the study maintained the theme that one could not accomplish coordinated storage on or management of the Colorado River without first securing interstate allocations. The study recommended that the Upper Basin States divide the waters among themselves through their own interstate compact, so as to allow this development to occur. [FN681 IV. THE 1931 CALIFORNIA SEVEN-PARTY AGREEMENT Although the Boulder Canyon Project Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") to allocate water by contract among water users in the Lower Basin, the Secretary requested that California water users provide him with recommendations regarding how to make the allocation within California. The Seven-Party Agreement ("Agreement"), between the major water agencies in California, made that intrastate apportionment. The Agreement allocated the fIrst 3.85 m.a.f. of water delivered to California to agricultural uses in the Imperial, Coachella, and Palo Verde areas, and to the Yuma Project of *308 the Bureau of Reclamation. The Agreement allocated the next two priorities, totaling 1.212 m.a.f., to the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California. [FN691 The Agreement allocated subsequent priorities to agricultural agencies. The priorities, and the agencies assigned them, are important to a clear understanding of current issues relating to California's use of water. Table I shows the allocation of priorities made by the Agreement. Table I: California Seven-Party Agreement Priorities TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE *309 There are two important points to note concerning these allocations under the Agreement. First, the Agreement @ 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.