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. . . allocation of scarce water resources." Id. (emphasis added). Third, while a state's claim of public ownership cannot place its groundwater beyond the purview of the Commerce Clause, "it may support a limited preference" for a state's own citizens "in the utilization of the resource." ld. Fourth, in light of Nebraska's conservation efforts, its groundwater "has some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in times of shortage." ld. at 957 (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (emphasis added). These reasons leave a good deal of confusion in their wake.5 However, it is clear that they are introduced with a reference to "times of severe shortage," that the first reason refers to "times and places of shortage," the second refers to "scarce water resources" and the fourth similarly refers to "times of shortage." More heartening is the fact that nowhere in the Sporhase decision is anything said about any particular drought that the region in question is suffering. Nor is there any such particularity in the statute, which presumably applies in dry years and wet years alike. Thus, it is not clear that the Sporhase Court intended its references to shortage and scarcity to be as pointed as they seem.6 The Nebraska statute's final provision, requiring reciprocity, fared less well than the first three. The Court deemed Nebraska's insistence on reciprocity "facially discriminatory" and said that it was not narrowly tailored enough to overcome that fault. ld. at 958. "Even though the supply of water in a particular well may be abundant, or perhaps even excessive, and even though the most beneficial use of that water might be in another State, such water may not be shipped into a neighboring State that does not permit its water to be used in Nebraska." Id. Hence, the reciprocity provision was struck down. EI Paso II A case which followed upon Sporhase and which is instructive in tracking the judicial implementation of the Supreme Court's reasoning is City of EI Paso v. Reynolds, 597 F.Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984). Because it was the second in a two-part series of litigation, it is commonly known as EI Paso 11.7 At issue was the constitutionality of two newly-passed New Mexico water statutes. ld. at 697-98, 704-5. One, S.B. 295, addressed the export of New Mexico's groundwater. The other, H.B. 12, placed a two- 5 For instance, what is the relationship between them? Does a State's right to claim public ownership (#3) rest on its obligation to protect the health of its citizens (#]), or vice versa? Given that equitable apportionment decrees and compacts "foster" the expectation that a state can sometimes restrict water within its borders (#2), what is the source of that expectation? A right to claim public ownership (#3)? An obligation to protect the health of its citizens (#I)? Finally, given a state's obligation to protect the health of its citizens (#]) and whatever force its claim of public ownership (#3) may possess in itself, does it necessarily have to have made efforts to conserve water in order for that water to gain "some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its won citizens" (#4)? 6 In any event, Georgia has, in fact, suffered recent droughts and shortages, which should stand it in good stead here. 7 For an account of the litigation's context, see City of El Paso v. Reynolds, 563 F.Supp. 379 (D.N.M. ] 983) ("El Paso F'), El Paso 11,597 F.Supp. at 696-97. See also A. Dan Tarlock & Darcy Alan Frownfelter, State Groundwater Sovereignty After Sporhase: The Case of the Hueco Bolson, 43 Oklahoma L. Rev. 27 (1990). 9