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<br />. <br />" <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />Clause in the same manner as a state's control over its ground (or surface) water. But is <br />this assumption warranted? <br /> <br />The argument that it is not can be broached by considering a sentence from <br />Toomer. "The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction <br />expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to <br />preserve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource." Toomer, 334 U.S. at <br />402. To this sentence was attached the following note: "See, e.g., Pound, An <br />Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 197-202. The fiction apparently gained currency <br />partly as a result of confusion between the Roman term imperium or governmental power <br />to regulate, and dominium, or ownership. Power over fish and game was, in origin, <br />imperium. Ibid." Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402 at n. 37. However, by Toomer's own <br />reasoning, state control over natural groundwater seems less like an imperium over fish <br />and wildlife and more like a dominium over land. <br /> <br />Toomer involved shrimp fishing in the three-mile belt off South Carolina's <br />Atlantic shore. ld. at 387-91. The Toomer Court distinguished McCready v. Virginia, 94 <br />U.S. 391 (1876), which had dealt with the right of Virginians to plant oysters in the tidal <br />waters of the Ware River. "The right of Virginians in Virginia waters, the Court said, <br />was 'a property right, and not a mere privilege or immunity of citizenship.' And an <br />analogy was drawn between planting oysters in a river bed and planting corn in state- <br />owned land." Toomer, 334 U.S. at 401 (quoting McCready, 94 U.S. at 395). McCready <br />did not apply, the Toomer Court said, because <br /> <br />However satisfactory the ownership theory explains the McCready case, <br />the very factors which make the present case distinguishable render that <br />theory but a weak prop for the South Carolina statute. That the shrimp are <br />migratory makes apposite Mr. Justice Holmes' statement in Missouri v. <br />Holland, 1920, 252 U.S. 416, 434, 384, 11 A.L. R. 984 [upholding the <br />Federal Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918], that "To put the claim of the <br />State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the <br />possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership." <br />Indeed, only fifteen years after the McCready decision, a unanimous Court <br />indicated that the rule of that case might not apply to free-swimming fish. <br /> <br />Toomer, 334 U.S. at 401-2 (citing Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 265 <br />(1891). <br /> <br />Seacoast Products, also relied on by Sporhase, followed Toomer closely in a <br />passage which has already been largely quoted: <br /> <br />"[t]o put the claim of the State upon title is," in Mr. Justice Holmes' <br />words, "to lean upon a slender reed." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, <br />434 (1920). A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a <br />private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of "owning" wild fish, <br />birds, or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any <br /> <br />13 <br />