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<br /> <br />agencies to protect their individual sovereign prerogatives, the more likely it has <br /> <br />become that regional water problems will become subject to federal programs <br /> <br />superseding state authority. Consequently, if states are to have a stronger r Ie in <br /> <br />regional water development, they must recognize and use the potential of the <br /> <br />compact as a mechanism for positive action on regional water problems and c nfer <br /> <br />adequate powers on the compact agencies to deal with such problems effectiV!Y. <br /> <br />Many of the water allocation compacts merely invite the president to a point a <br /> <br />federal representative to sit as a neutral, nonvoting chair of their commission , <br /> <br />occasionally granting that person the right to cast decisive votes when the sta es <br /> <br />cannot agree. The federal government in these situations appears to be little more <br /> <br />than an observer, without obligation to see to the coordination of federal plans or <br /> <br />programs in the region to the maximum extent feasible with those of the state. <br /> <br />Obviously a compact plan for an interstate river basin is not "comprehensive'" it <br /> <br />does not encompass federal water and, optimally, land planning and use as an <br /> <br />integral part of the effort, nor can it serve any meaningful function unless all <br /> <br />interests in a basin, and particularly the federal government, are committed to <br /> <br />carrying out their respective programs in accordance with it to the maximum e tent <br /> <br />consistent with federal law . <br /> <br />Against a generally unimpressive historical backdrop of interstate comp ct <br /> <br />performance, the federal-interstate compact on the Delaware River, which trave ses <br /> <br />11 <br />