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<br />Conflicts between federal water resource development projects and no -federal <br /> <br />projects dependent on water rights acquired under state law were inevitable. In <br /> <br />accordance with traditional "preemption" law grounded on the Supremacy CI use of <br /> <br />the Constitution, in cases of irreconcilable conflict between federal and state llw <br /> <br />federal law must prevail. In the 1950's and early 1960's a series of Supreme dourt <br /> <br />decisions tilting the respective roles of state and federal law in water resourcJ <br /> <br />development more to the federal government6/ and expanding the magnitude <br /> <br /> <br />Indian reserved water rights and water rights for other federal reservations7/ <br /> <br />consternation in the western states, but the Supreme Court later mitigated th <br /> <br />impact of its earlier decisions.s' <br /> <br />II. ALLOCATION AND MANAGEMENT OF INTERSTATE WATERS <br /> <br />Over this same time period the Supreme Court was implementing a nati nal <br /> <br />policy with respect to interstate waters. The United States Constitution antici ated <br /> <br /> <br />that regional disputes might arise within the newly.created federal system tha <br /> <br />would be beyond the power of a single state to deal with and yet not within wha <br /> <br />then thought to be relatively narrow powers which the states had delegated to t e <br /> <br />Congress. Hence it provided two express mechanisms for dealing with them. <br /> <br />6/ See, e.g., FPC v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955); Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 35 U.S. <br />275 (1958); City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963). <br /> <br />7/ Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). <br /> <br />5 <br />