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<br /> <br />Sharing Colorado River Water: History, Public Policy and the Colorado River Compact <br /> <br />Page 5 of 15 <br /> <br />\l <br /> <br />Formal approval for such a project, however, was not likely until California and AriZ( <br />resolved their dispute over Colorado River use. Lingering animosities prevented any <br />agreement between the two states, and so in 1952, Arizona asked the U.S. Supreme <br />Court for a judicial apportionment. <br /> <br />After 11 years the mammoth and complicated case concluded. The decision in Arizor <br />v. California resulted in major power shifts, between the states and between the states <br />and the federal government. Colorado River water was apportioned, with California <br />receiving 4.4 maf, Arizona 2.8 maf and Nevada 300,000 af, with each state also awart <br />all the water in their tributaries. Arizona was a big winner, gaining almost all the <br />advantages it sought in the 1922 compact. A nagging water supply problem was <br />resolved. <br /> <br />In its quest for a settlement, however, Arizona cut across the grain ofthe original <br />compact, and its victory is tinged with some sense of irony. The labors of the compac <br />negotiators were greatly motivated by a desire to avoid costly and lengthy litigation. <br />Yet, due to Arizona's efforts, the compact has had not only its day, but literally years <br />court. One of the most complicated and hotly contested cases in U. S. Supreme Court <br />history, lasting 11 years and costing almost $5 million, Arizona v. California easily Ii' <br />up to the worst fears of the compact negotiators. <br /> <br />Further, compact delegates distrusted, and in some cases actually feared federal <br />involvement in Colorado River affairs. Arizona v. California opened the door to fedel <br />participation. The decision interpreted the Boulder Canyon Act as empowering the <br />Secretary ofInterior to act as water master of the Lower Colorado River, to apportion <br />future surpluses and shortages among the states and even among users within the stab <br /> <br />Arizona's actions greatly contributed to undermining some of the political ideals that <br />motivated the making of the compact. Future application and interpretation of the <br />compact must reckon with this legacy. Yet Arizona was merely acting to protect its <br />interests. California was using its congressional clout to frustrate Arizona's claims. <br />However, in turning to the courts which generally sided with Arizona the state brougl <br />on unintended consequences. <br /> <br />Arizona's dispute with California might truly be described as "living history," having <br />roots in the past but, at the same time, sounding a theme that remains very much in fo <br />today. Concern about California still stalks Colorado Basin states, especially, once <br />again, Arizona, and greatly determines their Colorado River policies. <br /> <br />Colorado River Use Today <br /> <br />The compact "apportioned from the Colorado River in perpetuity to the Upper Basin; <br />the Lower Basin" 7.5 maf each per year. The states within each basin were to work Ol <br />each state's allocation. Unable to agree among themselves, the embattled Lower Basil <br />states settled the matter in the courts. <br /> <br />The Upper Basin states proved more amendable to a cooperative settlement. (By <br />reaching accord among themselves they avoided the more intrusive federal role that tl <br />quarrelsome southern states brought upon themselves.) A contract was signed in 194~ <br />assigning 51.75 percent to Colorado, 23 percent to Utah, 14 percent to Wyoming and <br /> <br />http://ag.arizona.edu/AZWATERlarroyo/101comm.html <br /> <br />9/1212006 <br />