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<br /> <br />Sharing Colorado River Water: History, Public Policy and the Colorado River Compact <br /> <br />Page 3 of 15 <br /> <br />"i.~ <br /> <br />"at or near Boulder Canyon" which would increase California's access to the Coloradt <br />River. Concern turned to alarm when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in June 1922 that <br />law of prior appropriation applied regardless of state lines. A fast growing state, i.e. <br />California, could then establish priority use of Colorado River water to the extreme <br />disadvantage of slower growing states in the upper basin. <br /> <br />Some form of concerted effort seemed called for. Delph Carpenter, a Colorado attornl <br />rose to the occasion and proposed that the Colorado River states negotiate a compact <br />determine individual state's rights to the river water. At the time interstate compacts tc <br />resolve water disputes was an untried, untested strategy. <br /> <br />Carpenter's reasons for advocating an interstate compact strikes a familiar note today. <br />He was very wary some even say paranoid about federal involvement in state affairs, <br />feared if the states did not get their houses in order the federal government would takl <br />charge, to the disadvantage of the states. Also, he wanted to head off litigation that <br />would be time-and-resource consuming and believed an interstate compact would <br />accomplish this end. <br /> <br />The compact's crowning accomplishment was the apportionment of Colorado River <br />water, between Upper and Lower Basin states. The delegates initially intended to <br />apportion river water directly to each state. A seemingly sensible approach, this strate <br />had the potential to prevent future conflicts among the states. The basis to determine <br />each state's share was to be the amount of irrigable land within a state. Determining Sl <br />acreage, however, proved to be a very contentious issue, one that threatened to <br />undermine compact negotiations. <br /> <br />Further, as the discussions progressed it became clear to many ofthe delegates that th <br />major disagreements on the table were between the upper and lower basins, not amon <br />the states within each basin. Also the data to determine appropriations to individual <br />states simply was not available. A two-basin strategy was viewed as a means to resol, <br />the difficulties, although it was not to the liking of all the delegates. Arizona's delegat <br />W. S. Norviel complained, "It doesn't arrive at any conclusion, and ... it leaves the tWI <br />divisions to work out their own salvation." <br /> <br />Despite the objections the adopted strategy was to divide Colorado River water equal <br />between Upper and Lower Basin states, with the demarcation line set at Lee's Ferry, <br />located in northern Arizona's canyon country close to the Utah border. Wyoming, <br />Colorado, Utah and New Mexico were designated Upper Basin states and California, <br />Arizona and Nevada Lower Basin states. Each basin was to receive 7.5 million acre-t <br />(mat) per year. Along with their allocations, the Lower Basin states could increase thl <br />apportionment by one maf. This represented a bonus to ensure lower basin acceptancI <br />the compact <br /> <br />(Actually the Upper Basin states were obliged to deliver 75 maf at Lee's Ferry during <br />each ten-year period. The extended time frame allowed the required delivery to be <br />averaged over time to make up for years of low flow. ) <br /> <br />The delegates figured allocations on hydrologic data from the Reclamation Bureau th <br />indicated annual Colorado River flow at Lees Ferry to be 16.4 maf. In truth, however: <br />Colorado River flow is a good deal less than that. Data from three centuries indicate a <br /> <br />http://ag.arizona.edu/AZWATERlarroyo/101comm.html <br /> <br />9/1212006 <br />