My WebLink
|
Help
|
About
|
Sign Out
Home
Browse
Search
PUB00156
CWCB
>
Publications
>
DayForward
>
PUB00156
Metadata
Thumbnails
Annotations
Entry Properties
Last modified
7/14/2011 11:24:34 AM
Creation date
1/18/2008 1:02:31 PM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
Publications
Year
2006
Title
Sharing Colorado River
CWCB Section
Administration
Author
Joe Gelt
Description
Sharing Colorado River
Publications - Doc Type
Other
There are no annotations on this page.
Document management portal powered by Laserfiche WebLink 9 © 1998-2015
Laserfiche.
All rights reserved.
/
61
PDF
Print
Pages to print
Enter page numbers and/or page ranges separated by commas. For example, 1,3,5-12.
After downloading, print the document using a PDF reader (e.g. Adobe Reader).
Show annotations
View images
View plain text
<br />Water markets can mean an end to water shortages <br /> <br />Page 7 of 27 <br /> <br />example, because water is cheap, irrigators <br />frequently apply it to marginally productive lands <br />and crops. Ifwater markets reduced agricultural <br />production, it would probably be on these marginal <br />lands. According to Wahl (1989, 188-90), <br />agricultural water use could decline by between 15 <br />percent and 20 percent through conservation <br />without significant decreases in production. The <br />Western Governors' Association Water Efficiency <br />Working Group concluded (1987, 110) it "does not <br />appear . . . that water markets present the threat to <br />traditional lifestyles or natural areas that is feared." <br /> <br />Indeed, in southern California, the Metropolitan <br />Water District signed an agreement under which it <br />will acquire 106,000 acre-feet of water per year for <br />35 years from the Imperial Irrigation District. The <br />water comes entirely from increases in water-use <br />efficiency brought about through techniques such as <br />lining irrigation canals or replacing them with pipe <br />to reduce waste. By paying for the improvements, <br />the Metropolitan Water District was able to acquire <br />the conserved water without reducing the number of <br />acres irrigated within the Imperial Irrigation District <br />(Reisner and Bates 1990). <br /> <br />Another force restricting water transfers is the <br />public trust doctrine. This common-law doctrine, <br />inherited by the United States from Great Britain, <br />originally protected the public"s interest in <br />commerce, fishing, and navigation. However, it has <br />been expanded beyond its traditional purposes to <br />include environmental protection and recreation and <br />has been used to divest long-held water rights. <br /> <br />In the 1983 Mono Lake case, for example, the <br />California Supreme Court held that the state of <br />California had a "public trust" responsibility to <br />protect the environment even though its action <br />would negate senior water rights held by the city of <br />Los Angeles. The court decided that water diverted <br />to Los Angeles should, instead, flow into Mono <br />Lake to support aquatic life and birds. Los Angeles <br />was not compensated for the loss of its water rights. <br />The city was forced to spend $38 million each year <br />to buy water from other sources (Economist 1994, <br />31). <br /> <br />In Montana, environmental groups asserted that the <br />public trust doctrine should apply to streams and <br />rivers that can be navigated recreationally. As a <br /> <br />http://www . perc.org/publications/policyseries/priming_ full.php ?s=2 <br /> <br />112/2006 <br />
The URL can be used to link to this page
Your browser does not support the video tag.