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\'. I/OIIIIC.\', l)5() P.2d 40(l, 40l) (Colo. 1(>98) (discussing the nondek~ation doctrinc generally).) Thc nondclcgation doctrine is not violated here becausc e\isling Colorado law regarding the ('olllpact prO\ides surticient standards to guidc the Governor's e\ercise of his authority to administer t hc Compact. Colorado law forhids t hc Governor li'om uni latera \I y bi ndi ng the State to an agreemcnt which modilies any authority, interest. or right of Colorado to thc waters it was apportioned through the Colorado River Compact. ,See ~ 37-W-IOl)( I), C.R.S. Furthermore, the Gowrnor's administration of the Compact docs not include the right to consider and adjust any claim or controversy among the Basin States "concerning the meaning or performance of any of the terms of the Colorado River Compact."() ~ 37-61-101, C.R.S. (Colorado River Compact, Art. VI). These statutes narrow the scope of the (iovernor's authority to administer thc Colorado River Compact and retain the legislature's power to make laws regarding the waters of the Colorado River.7 The conclusion that the delegation of authority to administcr interstate compacts does not violatc the nonde\egation doctrine is consistent with another purpose of that doctrine, which is to protect "the public from the imposition of irrational rules created by non-elected officials," Krupp, 1 P.3d at 183 (citation omitted). The Ciovernor "is a highly visible public otlicial" whose decisions necessarily attract the attention of the public and the news media. Pallzer, 680 N, W.2d at 689, '" I' the Govetl1or makes a policy choicc that is unacceptable to the people, the Govemor will be held accountable to the people." It!. Consl.'quently, the implicit statutory constraints on the Govemor's authority and thc Governor's position as an elected official conceivably impose adequate standards and procedural safeguards to render his delegation of legislative power constitutional. , Ilowever, legislative power is not improperly delegated when the General Assembly has described "what job must be done. who must do it, and the scope of his authority.'" 5lll'i.l'her v. B/'II\I'II, 42 P.2d 621. 626 (Colo. 1965); Ha::/i'r, 126 Colo. at 395-396 (citation omitted) ( "The General Assembly may not delegate the power to make a law; but it may delegate power to determine some fact or a state of things upon which the law, as prescribed, depends...The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The lirst cannot be done: to the latter no valid objection can be made."). t, Article VI of the Compact specilically provides: Should any claim or controversy arise between any two or more of the signatory States: (a) with respect to the waters of the Colorado River System not covered by thc terms of this compact; (b) over the meaning or performance of any of the terms of this compact: (c) as to the allocation of the burdens incident to the performance of any article of this compact or the delivery of waters as herein provided: (d) as to the construction or operation of works within the Colorado River Basin to be situated in two or more States. or to be constructed in one State for the benefit of another State; or (e) as to the diversion of water in one State for the benefit of another State: the Governors of the States affected, upon the request of one of them, shall forthwith appoint Commissioners with power to consider and adjust sueh claim or controversy, subject to ratification by the Legislatures of the States so affected. 7 While it may also be argued that the limitations imposed on the Governor fail for vagueness, such an argument fails. The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that the use of anything more than broad and general standards is impractical and inappropriate in many contexts. See Cottrell, 636 P.2d at 708. Administration of the Colorado River Compact is certainly one such situation. There are simply too many contingencies that could develop on a monthly, let alone yearly, basis that the use of anything other than general standards would be practical. These contingencies include fluctuating water and weather conaitions, increasing development in the Basin States, and political developments in anyone of the seven signatory states or between the states, 6