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Section 3 <br />Alternative Agricultural Water Transfer Methods to Traditional Purchase and Transfer <br />Supporting Information: <br />The SDCWA-IID, MWD- PVID and MWD- <br />Sacramento Valley programs all involved farmers <br />who wanted to remain in agriculture and where a <br />strong agricultural economy existed. <br />Financial Subcommittee Question 6 <br />"How do the annual local economic <br />impacts of a rotating fallowing program <br />compare with a permanent dry-up that <br />included voluntary payment in lieu of <br />taxes? (Loss of local tax revenue for <br />schools, government, etc.)" <br />Annual local economic impacts of a rotational <br />fallowing program are at maximum the fraction of <br />agriculture's economic contribution, which is <br />subject to annual fallowing. In fact, impacts would <br />be less due to MU payments to farmers and RFID. If <br />fallowing shifts among different parties, re- <br />classification ofassessor land status is unlikely, so <br />property taxes would be unaffected. Economic <br />impacts have been debated in other alternative <br />agricultural transfers, so no universal agreement on <br />this point is evident. Impacts of the example <br />discussed here would probably be minimal. <br />Although a smaller amount of crop production <br />would occur on farms when acreage is fallowed, the <br />economic effects of that lost production would be <br />mitigated by the program payments made to <br />participants. Participants would not experience a <br />loss of income as program payments would be at <br />least equal to lost revenue due to fallowing, if not <br />more. In some cases, there may also be the <br />possibility of dryland farming, which would allow <br />for some additional income. There may be some <br />third party losses of employment and revenues to <br />local businesses, but as mentioned above, program <br />payments made to participants would somewhat <br />offset these losses. Farmers are likely to continue to <br />spend money, including receipts for participation in <br />the fallowing program, on farm operations, including <br />labor, equipment and supplies, and in other <br />businesses in the community. <br />In comparison to a traditional agricultural transfer, <br />even if voluntary payments were made in lieu of <br />taxes, this fallowing example would have a greater <br />positive net economic effect compared to a <br />permanent dry-up and fallowing of the land, unless <br />the land was developed for other income-producing <br />uses. Voluntary in lieu payments made by the <br />purchaser of the water rights would go to local <br />governmental entities to mitigate loss of tax <br />revenues for services such as schools and other <br />publicly provided community services. However, <br />these payments are not likely to provide support to <br />local, private sector, businesses that have lost a <br />portion of their customer base due to the loss of <br />farms, and farmer spending. These voluntary <br />payments would not create jobs to mitigate the loss <br />of employment due to decreased agricultural <br />production. However, as noted above, if the land <br />was dryland farmed or converted to another use, the <br />loss of revenue may be lessened or perhaps revenue <br />increased, depending upon the type of development <br />and alternate use of the land. <br />The size and significance of third-party impacts have <br />been debated as part of existing fallowing programs, <br />but the economic drawbacks of fallowing programs <br />would be minimal compared to a traditional <br />agricultural transfer, unless the land were developed <br />for other income producing uses, such as dryland <br />farming, residential or industrial. <br />3-28 FINAL DRAFT <br />