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<br />l,;..- "'-'f!'>A <br /> <br /> <br />000711 <br /> <br /> <br />especially where the United States has chosen not to intervene? <br /> <br />III. EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT BY INTERSTATE COMPACT <br /> <br />How Can Interstate Compacts be Infused With Watershed Protection and Managetll.el1t;"~ <br />Obligations? . '~;/ <br /> <br />Beginning with the Colorado River Compact of 1922, Congress has granted its constitutionally,:,>; <br />required consent to some 26 additional water allocation compacts.16 Many of these compact$'~j~ <br />expressly purport to effect an equitable apportionment among the signatory states. See, l?;g.t,ii< <br />Colorado River Compact (Art. 1), Rio Grande Compact (Art. 1), Upper Colorado River Basf#,;\ <br />Compact (Art. 1), Arkansas River Basin Compact (Art. 1). Unfortunately, compact allocatiotlSA" <br />unlike the decrees in equitable apportionment decisions that permit their reopening in appropri<<te" <br />situations, are frozen in time and the water supply data and other relevant factors underlying them'/,. <br />are woefully outdated. The vast majority ofthe existing water allocation compacts in the West were~& <br />entered into before the full impact of the "reservation doctrine" of federal and Indian water rights~::~ <br />was announced in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, in 1963. Consequently, the estimated watet"; <br />requirements which formed the basis of the compact allocations were probably significantly~ <br />understated for those states with substantial reserved federal and Indian lands. Similarly, it seems) <br />pbvious that none of them anticipated the impact of the federal environmental statutes of the last 35 <br />years, such as the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act, on compact allocations and their.:" <br />utilization. Indeed many of the allocation compacts are over 40 years old and are so environmentally. . <br />'outdated in many respects that it is unlikely that most of them would currently receive Congressional. <br />consent. Consequently it would be unwise for states who are parties to many of those compacts to <br />place unquestioning reliance on the ability to use their allocations under those compacts since . <br />changing physical and geographic factors or use patterns, coupled with the limitation of water quality <br />control standards under the Clean Water Act or the aquatic habitat protective provisions of the <br />Endangered Species Act, might never permit those waters to be, put to use in the quantities or at the <br />times contemplated. Since Congress has reserved the right to amend its required consent legislation <br />for existing compacts, should it exercise that right in appropriate compacts to impose an express duty <br />on each state to undertake good faith cooperative efforts toward watershed protection and <br />management? Should it do so in consenting to future compacts or amendments to existing compacts? <br />Would such a requirement likely lead the compact states to constructive cooperation or only foment <br />litigation? <br /> <br />Compact litigation is on the rise and seems likely to increase as water supplies dwindle and demands <br />increase against an unanticipated overlay of35 yeaTS of environmental legislation. Should an attempt <br />be made at an early opportunity to persuade the Court to conclude that most compacts impose an <br />implied obligation on the compacting states to undertake good faith cooperative efforts toward <br />watershed protection and management either (1) as an independent enforceable compact obligation <br />or (2) as a condition to enforcing alleged breaches of other compact obligations? In my report as <br />Special Master in the Canadian River litigation, I made a similar recommendation: 17 <br /> <br />l6See Sherk, n. 6 supra at 30. <br /> <br />17Report of Jerome C. Muys, Special Master, Oklahoma and Texas v. New Mexico, No. 109, <br />Original (October 15, 1990) at 30-31. <br /> <br />312 <br />