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<br />OOlG51 <br /> <br />satisfaction provided by the recreational exper~ence and, con- <br /> <br />sequently, the participation rate, as shown in Figure 2. In <br /> <br />this case, the total satisfaction of all users increases with <br /> <br />increasing number of users up to point ul, even though the mean <br /> <br />satisfaction per user is steadily declining (due in part to the <br /> <br />disutility produced by crowding). At pointuI, total net user <br /> <br />benefits, as shown by curve TB, are at their maximum level, bI. <br /> <br />This is the social optimum. However, the number of users will <br /> <br />continue to increase until point U2, where the net satisfaction <br /> <br />derived by the marginal user declines to zero on the marginal <br /> <br />users benefit function, MB (MB and TB do not necessarily share <br /> <br />a common vertical scale). Between ul and u2,the decrease in <br /> <br />satisfaction which crowding causes the non-marginal users to <br /> <br />experience exceeds the benefits which accrue to the marginal <br /> <br />user and, thus, total benefits decline from bI to b2), but the <br /> <br />marginal user considers only his own satisfaction and, thus, <br /> <br />continues to crowd in. This is known as the freeway problem. <br /> <br />Figure 2 <br />Crowding Response Function <br /> <br />NET USER <br />aENEFITS <br /> <br />b1 <br /> <br /> <br />rn <br /> <br />bZ <br /> <br />MB <br /> <br />U1 <br />NUMBER OF USERS <br /> <br />Uz <br /> <br />6 <br />