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932 ARIZONA LAW REYlEW (Vol. :u ~ure a ''wide regional benefit" from the power, the Secretary allocated eighteen percent of the Hoover firm energy to Arizona and eighteen per_ cent to Nevada, to be taken as the states became able to utilize and pay for the power.33 Therefore, Los Angeles and Southern California Edison ac- tually have a firm entitlement, after allowing for the withdrawal rights of the states and municipalities, to nineteen percent and nine percent of the !loover ~ energy ~espe~i~ely.34 De~pite th~se r~ductions from the ong- mal allocatIOns, Califorma' mterests still receive SIXty-four percent of the Hoover power. Thus, the ability of the California customers to begin pay- ing for power immediately, coupled with the project's primary purpose of creating a reliable supply of water for irrigation and domestic use, led di- rectly to the allocation of sixty-four percent of the firm energy to the Cali- fornia allottees and only eighteen percent each to Arizona and Nevada>> Since the original allocation of power resulted from the overriding need to finance the project, and this need is no longer of dominant con- cern, new concerns may affect the reallocation of the power in 1987. The: federal investment in the dam and power plant will presumably be fully amortized by 1987, and Arizona and Nevada presently have a greater need for, and capacity to take, Hoover power. The issue regarding reallocation of power thus will be whether, in the absence of the factors that led to the original allocation, continuation of the existing allocation is mandated or forbidden by the terms of the BCP A. THE SOURCES OF THE CONFLICT IN THE BCP A The issues involved in the controversy over the reallocation of the power are whether the BCP AI) grants an absolute right of renewal of the original contracts, including the existing allocation of power,36 2) grants each state an absolute right to one-third of the Hoover power outpUt,37 or 3) leaves the allocation of the power to the Secretary's discretion, a discre- tion that may be limited only by the requirements that the allocation be in the public interest of the region and that the power go first to states and municipalities~ 38 33. Id In this way, the Secretary ensured a source of revenue adequate to amortize the dam', costs, while attempting to spread the power throughout the region. Under the original allotment. Los Angeles and Southern California Edison were required to pay for and were able to use J7~ and 27% respectively until the states and municipalities contracted for their allotment of power. Id Arizona and Nevada were entitled to contract for their shares at any time during the 50-year amortization of the project but were not under any firm obligation ever to take the power, since: they could both take and relinquish it, on notice, at any time during the SO-year period. 14 Nevada exercised its drawback privilege to begin taking energy in 1936. Arizona did not execute a contract until 1945, and began taking energy in 1948. DocUMENTS, supa note 4, at 72 34. CONTRACTS, sup,a note 4, at 601; see sup,a notes 28-33 and accompanying toxt. 35. The California allottees contracted and dealt directly with, first, the Department of Inte- rior and now with WAPA. The power aRoUed to Arizona and Nevada is sold to and cbann~led through the state agencies, the Arizona Power Authority (APA) and tbe Nevada Colorado River Commission (NCRC). See gene,aI'! DOCUMENTS, SUpll note 4, at A301-A471; Statement of the APA and the NCRC, WAPA Public Comment Forum, Las Vegas, Nevada (Jan. 21,1982). 36. See California Brief, SUP'II note 7, at 5; iJifm notes 122.44 and accompanying text. 37. See Nevada Brief, sup,a note 8, at 8-9; iJifra notes 70-94 and accompanymg text. . 38. See WAPA Staff Discussion Paper,SIf"1I note 100iJifrll notes 179-207 and accompanJUlS text. 19821 f pali ~ the ~. app f Th l See " enc ~ " 1 CUS i f ~' Ca . ;} , tea J ~ !l ~ 1 I f ~ i , i i