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<br /> <br />001537 <br /> <br />~< <br />!;' <br />l:. <br />i.l, <br />IT <br />I'"~ <br />I~ <br />f <br />}.- 1 <br /> <br />19821 <br /> <br />HOOVER DAM ENERGY <br /> <br />941 <br /> <br />ttition of the rights of the states upon whose land the dam was built,1I2 the <br />states assert that to make this recognition of states' rights subject to secreta-' <br />rial discretion regarding the public interest would ''upset [the] fundamen- <br />tal understanding of the balanced roles of the Federal Government and <br />the states in the development of Hoover Dam." 113 The states also find it <br />~gnificant that Congress rejected an amendment proposed by the Secre- <br />tarY of the Interior that would have ,deleted the preference clause and <br />made all allotments subject to secretarial discretion in accordance with the <br />policy of the Federal Power Act.1l4 Thus, it is argued that the "super- <br />preference" right cannot be subject to any form of secretarial discretion. I IS <br />In addition to the required compensation of previous contractors, Ne- <br />vada and Arizona state that the "super-preference" right is subject to only <br />three conditions. First, under section 617d(c), the power taken by the <br />states in accordance with the "super-preference" right may be used only <br />within the state.116 Moreover, the "super-preference" right must be con- <br />tracted for within six months after the Secretary gives notice of the allot- <br />ment pursuant to the preference section of the Act.ll7 Finally, the <br />preference granted by the statute is no more than an entitlement to power, <br />lIld the states must contract on the same terms and conditions, and at the <br />same price, as any other power contractor.ltS Thus, in Arizona and Ne- <br />vada's view~ the asserted "super-preference" right is not limited in any way <br />by the Secretary's discretion in applying the preference c1ause.119 <br />Pursuant to this view of the "super-preference" right, Nevada and Ar- <br />izona each demand an allocation when the current contracts expire in 1987 <br />of one-third of the existing Hoover firm energy capacity.120 The states fur- <br />ther demand an. allocation of one-third of any new power capacity created <br />at Hoover Dam by the proposed Hoover upgrading and Hoover "mod," if <br />these additions are financed by the federal government.t21 For Arizona <br /> <br />~~ " <br />" <br /> <br />r <br />1'1i ' <br /> <br />:; ~ ' , <br />1'(" : <br />!~', . :: <br />rL '. <br />i:t:.. "; <br />i.;.,' ' <br />~r, <br />i;,L ' <br />", <br />." ~ <br />","-' <br /> <br />~--..,. <br />};;:: <br />I~i' <br />. ~,!:, <br />I;.: <br />j;, <br />'I, <br /> <br />\:q <br />...', <br />r:C <br />',\', <br />~,[ <br />!'. , <br />!; <br />i~P <br />liJ. <br />~" <br />~':;' <br />Ilii! <br />f~!j~ _: <br />~~:~\' : <br />',f. <br />l';ij <br />~l-l ~ <br />IV' <br />~Iifl'l'" <br />n, <br />';i"l" <br />:l.~ <br />(!: ' <br />.w <br />" <br />~ ~ <br />t:, ' <br />~",: , <br />;~ -' . <br />n <br />~!;; <br />~ <br /> <br />112. See id at 83; .see supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. <br />III Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 83. The Pittman Resolution in part arose from the now- <br />tlisaedited concern over the federal government's constitutional power to engage in the sale of <br />power for profit. See 69 CONGo REc. 9652"54; Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 63-64. . <br />114. See Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 82. Weight is often given to congressional action <br />rqecting proposed amendments. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. <br />Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 460-61 (1974). <br />1lS. See Nevada Brief, .supra note 8, at 83. <br />116. See 43 U.S.C. fi 617d(c) (1976); Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 70. <br />117. See 43 U.S.C. fi 6I1d(c) (1976); Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 70. <br />118. See 43 U.S.C. fi 617d(c) (1976); Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 70. <br />119. See 43 U.S.C. fi 617d(c) (1976); 16 U.S.C. fi 800(a) (1976);sup,a notes lOS-IS and accom- <br />panying text; sup,a notes 52-69 and accompanying text. <br />120. Joint Statement of the APA and the NCRC, supra note 8. Firm power is dependable <br />tnergy calculated on the bll$is of anticipated stream flow, while secondary energy is undependable <br />energy available when the water level is in excess of the anticipated stream flow. See Arizona <br />Power Auth. V. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231, 1236 n.20 (9th Cir. 1977). ' <br />121. Joint Statement of the APA and NCRC,su.e,a note 8. The Hoover upgrading is a project <br />lhrough which the existing generating equipment will be made more efficient, so as to increase the <br />Umc-plate ratin~ of the Hoover Dam from 1,340 MW to 1,800 MW of firm power. Proposed <br />~eting Critena, supra note 4, at 46,867. The Hoover "mod" will increase the name-plate <br />Iaung by another 500 MW. Id The "mod" increase will produce only peaking power, not firm <br />en~gy, Id at 46,869. If the federal government refuses to finance the upgrading and "mod." <br />ArizOna and Nevada have offered to finance the projects through-bonds and are willing to obtain <br />1II FERC license to operate them. Joint Statement of the APA and NCRC, sup,a note 8. The <br /> <br />r, <br />~:' ' <br />k: <br />I: . <br /> <br />~. <br /> <br />,!: ; <br />t:, , <br />k~',,~ . 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