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<br />HOOVER DAM ENERGY
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<br />941
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<br />ttition of the rights of the states upon whose land the dam was built,1I2 the
<br />states assert that to make this recognition of states' rights subject to secreta-'
<br />rial discretion regarding the public interest would ''upset [the] fundamen-
<br />tal understanding of the balanced roles of the Federal Government and
<br />the states in the development of Hoover Dam." 113 The states also find it
<br />~gnificant that Congress rejected an amendment proposed by the Secre-
<br />tarY of the Interior that would have ,deleted the preference clause and
<br />made all allotments subject to secretarial discretion in accordance with the
<br />policy of the Federal Power Act.1l4 Thus, it is argued that the "super-
<br />preference" right cannot be subject to any form of secretarial discretion. I IS
<br />In addition to the required compensation of previous contractors, Ne-
<br />vada and Arizona state that the "super-preference" right is subject to only
<br />three conditions. First, under section 617d(c), the power taken by the
<br />states in accordance with the "super-preference" right may be used only
<br />within the state.116 Moreover, the "super-preference" right must be con-
<br />tracted for within six months after the Secretary gives notice of the allot-
<br />ment pursuant to the preference section of the Act.ll7 Finally, the
<br />preference granted by the statute is no more than an entitlement to power,
<br />lIld the states must contract on the same terms and conditions, and at the
<br />same price, as any other power contractor.ltS Thus, in Arizona and Ne-
<br />vada's view~ the asserted "super-preference" right is not limited in any way
<br />by the Secretary's discretion in applying the preference c1ause.119
<br />Pursuant to this view of the "super-preference" right, Nevada and Ar-
<br />izona each demand an allocation when the current contracts expire in 1987
<br />of one-third of the existing Hoover firm energy capacity.120 The states fur-
<br />ther demand an. allocation of one-third of any new power capacity created
<br />at Hoover Dam by the proposed Hoover upgrading and Hoover "mod," if
<br />these additions are financed by the federal government.t21 For Arizona
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<br />112. See id at 83; .see supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
<br />III Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 83. The Pittman Resolution in part arose from the now-
<br />tlisaedited concern over the federal government's constitutional power to engage in the sale of
<br />power for profit. See 69 CONGo REc. 9652"54; Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 63-64. .
<br />114. See Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 82. Weight is often given to congressional action
<br />rqecting proposed amendments. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
<br />Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 460-61 (1974).
<br />1lS. See Nevada Brief, .supra note 8, at 83.
<br />116. See 43 U.S.C. fi 617d(c) (1976); Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 70.
<br />117. See 43 U.S.C. fi 6I1d(c) (1976); Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 70.
<br />118. See 43 U.S.C. fi 617d(c) (1976); Nevada Brief, supra note 8, at 70.
<br />119. See 43 U.S.C. fi 617d(c) (1976); 16 U.S.C. fi 800(a) (1976);sup,a notes lOS-IS and accom-
<br />panying text; sup,a notes 52-69 and accompanying text.
<br />120. Joint Statement of the APA and the NCRC, supra note 8. Firm power is dependable
<br />tnergy calculated on the bll$is of anticipated stream flow, while secondary energy is undependable
<br />energy available when the water level is in excess of the anticipated stream flow. See Arizona
<br />Power Auth. V. Morton, 549 F.2d 1231, 1236 n.20 (9th Cir. 1977). '
<br />121. Joint Statement of the APA and NCRC,su.e,a note 8. The Hoover upgrading is a project
<br />lhrough which the existing generating equipment will be made more efficient, so as to increase the
<br />Umc-plate ratin~ of the Hoover Dam from 1,340 MW to 1,800 MW of firm power. Proposed
<br />~eting Critena, supra note 4, at 46,867. The Hoover "mod" will increase the name-plate
<br />Iaung by another 500 MW. Id The "mod" increase will produce only peaking power, not firm
<br />en~gy, Id at 46,869. If the federal government refuses to finance the upgrading and "mod."
<br />ArizOna and Nevada have offered to finance the projects through-bonds and are willing to obtain
<br />1II FERC license to operate them. Joint Statement of the APA and NCRC, sup,a note 8. The
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