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.. NATURALRESOURCES/OURNAL [Vol. 40 Fall 20oo} MANAGING ECOSYSTEM CONSERVATION 845 AUbesame time, Delta conservation cannot be implemented by the Untied States acting alone. The Delta's welfare is subject to local land management as well as the availability of water from the north. In establishing the Biosphere Reserve of the Upper Gulf of California and Colorado River Delta, Mexico demonstrated commitment to Delta ecosystem preservation.104 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the United States would be willing to send water across the border without a corollary commitment from Mexico to insure that these waters reach Delta ecosystems and to improve natural resource management and protection in the Delta. A binational agreement will allow Mexico and the United States to establish a goal for conservation of the Delta, commit resources to this goal, and define a process to achieve it. Each of these three objectives poses a challenge. Straightforward commitments of water, land, and institutional support for environmental purposes should go far to sustain the Delta's ecosystems, but these alone will not suffice. Like all ecosystems, the Delta is dynamic. Indicators of ecological stability such as the presence of keystone species are useful for monitoring the efficacy of restoration efforts, but do not clearly translate into management prescriptions. Optimally, an agreement will recognize this and allow flexibility in management without forgoing measurable commitments such as quantified instream flows, area of protected lands, and management resources. 2. A Binational Institution This need for flexibility suggests that a binational agreement should establish an institution with the responsibility to monitor the health of the Delta and the contributions of Mexico and the United States to sustaining " the Delta. Whether a new or newly identified organization, it should have a mandate to monitor and study Delta ecosystems, manage transboundary water movement, promote the sustainable use of water in the Delta, and encourage greater public participation in decisions that affect the Delta. Numerous international environmental agreements have been signed in recent decades, and in virtually every case they are intended to solve well- defined problems by creating institutions to define social practices, assign roles to participants in these institutions, and govern interactions.I05 For example, the Great Lakes ecosystems benefit from a binational agreement that established the Intemational]oint Commission of the United States and Canada.106 The Commission is charged with assisting and monitoring both nations' progress towards prohibiting the discharge of toxic substances, providing financial assistance for the construction of publicly owned waste treatment works, coordinating planning processes, and developing best management practices.I07 3. National Mandatesfor Conservation C"' A binational agreement will also provide a mandate for C;;~ conservation of Delta ecosystems to myriad institutions within each nation. W Commitment at the national level to an international agreement will affect W the behavior of sub-national and non-state actors by influencing unfolding CD political processes. loa Absent a mandate, sub-national actors that manage water storage and flow, protect species, manage floodplain 8J\d watershed lands, and use water for consumptive purposes have little incentive to consider the Delta in the numerous decisions they make that bear on its health. Because the power of water users is presently greater than that of conservation interests, sub-national actors do not consider impacts to Delta ecosystems in their decision processes. In the United States, managers at the BOR have not recognized the Colorado River delta as a legitimate conservation priority. Specifically, the BOR has consistently excluded Delta species from environmental planning processes such as the 1996 biological assessment for operations on the lower Colorado River109 and the more recent Lower Colorado River Multi-Species Conservation Program. 1 10 In both cases, the agency denies responsibility for the environmental health of the river beyond the U.S. border by excluding the Delta from its planning areas and excluding the health of the Delta's people, animals, and plants from its objectives. The FWShas concurred with BOR and has not considered the impacts of BOR actions on listed species in Mexico.1Il 106. See Agreement on Great La1ces Water Quality, Nov. 22, 1978, U.S.-can., art. 7,30 V.S.T. 1383. 107. See id. 108. See Young, supra note lOS, at 25-27. 109. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, DSSCRIP110N AND AssESSMENT OPQpERATIONS, MAJN1'ENANCS, AND SENSI'1lVll SPECIES OF 11iE loWER COLORADO RIVER" at leA) (1996), <http://www.lc.usbr.gov/-g2000/assess/tit1epg.htm>. 110. See Notice of Intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) /Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and notice of public sooping meetinss, 64 Fed. Reg. 27,000, 27,001 (1999). 111. See U.S. FIsH AND WILDUFE5ERVICE, FINAL BJOLOGICAL AND CONFERENCE OPINION ON loWER COLORADO RIVER OPERATIONS AND MAlNTENANCE-LA1cE MEAD 10 SOU11iBRLY INtUNATIONAL BoUNDARY 1 (1997). Por availr.hility of this document, see Notice of ava1lability of Biological Opinion and notice of public meetings on Bureau of Reclamation's lower Colorado River operations and maintenance, 62 Ped. Reg. 28,894 (1997). 104. The Biosphere Reserve is among the minority of Mexico's protected areas that receive regular funding from the federal government. See Michelle Nijhuis, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, July 3, 1986, at 1. 105. See generally Oran R. YoW'\g, Hitting the M4rk, ENvIRONMENT, Oct. 1999, at 20.