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IJ U j ~ ~) marketing function previously performed by the Department of the Interior. An amendment to the Act referred to as the McGovern-Meeds amendment specifically prohibited altering, without congressional approval, the allocations of costs of existing, multi-purpose facilities from which power had been marketed by Interior. The proponents state that since elimination of the ultimate development concept would necessarily alter cost allocations (by eliminating certain project features), it too would be contrary to law (Weinberg, 1983). Another concern of proponents of the ultimate development concept is that elimination of its use could significantly increase the power rates charged by PMA's. This might occur either as a result of the reallocation of project costs by changing some previously non-reimbursable functions into reimbursable functions, and/or by ,I changing some reimbursable functions from non-interest bearing to interest bearing. 'This too would be contrary to law, proponents say, because numerous federal statutes, including the Flood Control Act of 1944, require the disposition of surplus electric power from federal projects: . . . in such manner as to encourage the most widespread use thereof at the lowest possible rates to consumers consistent with sound business principles (Flood Control Act of 1944, P.L. 534 - 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., Section 5). B. The Jurisdictional Issue The arena for disagreement over the ultimate development concept has largely been hearings before the Federal Energy Regula tory Commission. Although the Secretary of the Department of Energy has the authority to set rates for power marketed from federal projects, and currently does so based upon power repayment studies conducted by PMA's, FERC has the final authority to approve the rates. This -11-