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<br />. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />.. . . . the reservation doctrine frustrates sourrl <br />planning in the public am private sectors of the <br />econany. The prospective claims of the governrrent <br />are highly uncertain as to time, manner am quantity <br />of use. Consequently, no pla.nJ1er or investor can <br />establish a rreaningful water budget. It is im- <br />p:lssible to prove how =y non-federal projects <br />were not urrlertaken because of these uncertainties, <br />but stat6Tlents to the Crnnnission revealed profound <br />concern on the part of state officials." 23/ <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />Con=rent with the develq::nent of the reservation doctrine. the <br />Supr6Tle Court was narro.vly construing the scope of the state role urrler <br />the reclamation laws. Astonishing though it seems, since 1902 when the <br />Reclamation Act was enacted, the Suprerre Court, prior to its rrost <br />recent decision, had decided only three cases which actually presented <br />questions of interpretation of Section 8 of the Act: Ivanhoe Irrigation <br />District v. McCracken, 24/ City of Fresno v. California, 25/ am <br />Arizona v. California. 26/ - <br /> <br />Both Ivanhoe am City of Fresno dealt with the ~ct of Section 8 <br />up:ln the 160-a=e rule and up:m the irrigation priority provision of the <br />reclamation laws. The Court determined that where Congress has laid <br />d= a specific am marrlatory prerequisite as binding in the operation <br />of reclamation projects, that specific marrlate may not be ignored in <br />favor of a general p:llicy of deference to state law. This reflects a <br />quite narrow am traditional canon of statutory interpretation that the . <br />specific controls the general. Nevertheless, the Court in both cases <br />proceeded to discuss the Section generally in the broadest p:lssible <br />tenns. 27/ "As we read Section 8," the Court said in Ivanhoe without any <br />expla..'1ation or citation of authority, "it merely requires the United <br />States to oorrply with state law when, in the construction and operation <br />of a reclamation project, it becanes necessary for it to ao::ruire water <br />rights or vested interests therein." 28/ <br /> <br />This very sweeping limitation was reinforced in the City of Fresno <br />case. There, after noting disapprovingly the city's claim that Section <br />requires campliance with California's state statutes relating to the <br />priority of danestic over irrigation uses, Mr. Justice Clark said that <br />the effect of Section 8 in such a case is to leave to state law the <br />definition of the property interests, if any, for which ccmpensation <br />must be made. This interpretation of Section 8 would apparently elimin- <br />ate state law entirely fran control Oller the distribution ani use of <br />project water, ani would represent a total repudiation of the states I <br />p:lsition. It was, in fact, an alm::>st verbatum adoption of the inter- <br />pretation which the United States in its briefs had urged up:ln the <br />-Court. With their very narro.v holdings and very broad dicta, these <br />cases left the status of Section 8 clouded in considerable W1Certainty. ~ <br /> <br />In the subsequent case of Arizona v. California, a central issue <br />was how the waters app:lrtioned to each state were then to be distributed <br />to users within the state. The case rose under the Boulder Canyon <br />Project Act, 30/ a separate reclamation law dealing with the waters of <br />the lower Colorado. Section 14 of that Act incorporates by reference <br />Section 8 of the 1902 Act. <br /> <br />. <br /> <br />-4- <br /> <br />90. <br />