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. . was =eated, it is reasonable to conclude that the United states in- tended to resexve the necessary water. HcMever, the Court went on to dete:rmine that "where water is only valuable for a secordary use of the reservation, there arises the contrary inference that Congress interrled, consistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in the same II\3!lIler as any other public or private appropriator." 80/ In other \>Drds, except in the case of reserved rights to cany out the - primary purpose of the reservation, the Court detennined that federal agencies are to acquire water for other conjressionally authorized uses pursuant to state laws, like any other appropriator. The Solicitor's Opinion suggests that the Court rray have been re ferring to rrere a:rnpliance with state procedures, rather than with pr=edural and substantive state water law. HCMever, an objective reading of the language of the Court in context makes it clear that the Suprene Court interrled a:rnpliance with both substantive and procedural state laws. . In the sentence :inm2diately following the Court's conclusion that the governrrent, with the exception of resezyed rights, \>Duld acquire water in the same rranner as any other public or private appropriator the Court stated that "Congress indeed has appropriated funds for the acquisition urrler state law of water to J:e used on federal reser- vations." 81/ [emphasis added] The Court then cited an example in the National Parks Act where, " Congress authorized appropriations for the "invest[i]gation and establishment of water rights in accordance with local custom, law, and decisions of courts, including the acquisition of water rights or of lands or of interest in lards or rights-of-vlaY for use and protection of water rights necessary or beneficial in the administration and public use of the national parks and rronurrents." 82/ . Again in supporting its earlier conclusion, the Supreme COurt referred to the fact that "the agencies responsible for administering the federal reservations have also recognized Congress' intent to acquire un:J.er state law any water not essential to the specific purposes of the reservation." [emphasis added] 83/ MJreover, a distinction betv.Ben procedure an:l substance with respect to the appropriative d=trine is conceptually untenable. The pr=edures by which an in::lividual acquires an appropriative water right consists of a pennit which represents a state detennination that the water will be used for "beneficial" purposes. This right is inherently limited by the duty, usually found in the corrlitions in the pennit, to stop using water when its use ceases to be "beneficial." 84/ Substantive rights can therefore only be acquired by follCMing specified procedures, ard in folla.ving successfully these pr=edures, substantive obligations are impJsed related to beneficial use. Thus, requiring federal agencies to a:rnply with state "pr=edures," but not substantive water law \>Duld J:e entirely inconjruent with state systens for all=atin;r water in the West. 85/ That the Congress intended no such result in the New Mexico case is also clear fran the decision which was issued on the same day in . United States v. California. 86/ The Court in the California case rejected a similar argument that Section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act merely required the Secretary of Interior to file a notice with the states of its intent to appropriate and to thereafter ignore the substantive -12- ^^