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Last modified
1/26/2010 2:58:06 PM
Creation date
10/12/2006 4:15:04 AM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
Water Supply Protection
File Number
8278.300
Description
Title I - Mexican Treaty
Basin
Colorado Mainstem
Date
9/1/1991
Author
Anne DeMarsay CRBSCF
Title
The Brownell Task Force and the Mexican Salinity Problem - A Narrative Chronology of Events
Water Supply Pro - Doc Type
Publication
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<br />10 <br /> <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br /> <br />Legislative History of P.L. 93-320 <br /> <br />As soon as the Minute was officially signed, the Departments of Interior and State began to draft <br />implementing legislation. Because of internal differences within the agencies and the <br />involvement of an unusual number of individuals in the process, progress was slow, particularly <br />in Interior. It was further impeded by arguments between Interior and OMB over such issues <br />as how the desalting plant should be procured and who should have responsibility for its <br />construction. <br /> <br />OMB feared that the plant would set a precedent for Federally funded, public- works-style <br />solutions to water quality problems (as indeed its supporters in OSW hoped it would). It insisted <br />that the Secretary of State (acting through mwC) rather than the Secretary of the Interior, <br />construct, operate, and maintain the plant. Assignment of this responsibility to the State <br />Department was intended to make it clear that the desalting plant was a unique response to an <br />international problem. Within the Executive Branch, OMB finally prevailed, although the <br />Congress later disagreed. P.L. 93-320 vested authority for Title I in the Secretary of the <br />Interior, who designated the Bureau of Reclamation as the construction agency. <br /> <br />Because of these delays, the Administration's bills were not sent to the Congress until February <br />7, 1974. Minute No. 242 called for passage of implementing legislation by July I, 1974. <br />Concerned members in both Houses had already introduced their own bills, drafted with the <br />assistance of the Committee of Fourteen (and the Lower Colorado Region of the Bureau of <br />Reclamation, which provided a drafting service): H.R. 12165 was introduced by Rep. Harold <br />T. (Bizz) Johnson of California on January 21, and S. 2940, by Senators Paul Fannin of Arizona <br />and Alan Bible of Nevada on February 1. <br /> <br />These Congressional bills were the basis of hearings and mark-up; the Administration bills were <br />largely ignored. The House held three days of hearings on March 4, 5, and 8. The Senate <br />hearings on April 26 lasted one day. <br /> <br />During the hearings, there was relatively little debate over Minute No. 242 or the basic elements <br />of the solution. Considering that the Minute was more of an amendment to the 1944 treaty than <br />an interpretation of its terms, the Senate might have insisted on ratifying it, but no such <br />suggestion appears on the record. The states, their Congressional representatives, and agency <br />witnesses soft-peddled their concerns and disagreements. The premise behind the Minute and <br />the workability of the technical measures that were to implement the agreement were never <br />really examined. <br /> <br />The states did raise several questions never answered by Administration witnesses, <br />though-questions that may come back to haunt the Federal government when the desalting plant <br />finally comes on line: <br /> <br />. Why is the Federal government committing over $100 million to solve a water <br />quality problem at the border, while ignoring projected increases in salinity above <br />Imperial Dam? Why has it not taken a basin-wide approach? <br />
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