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<br />I <br />I. <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br /> <br />I <br />I <br /> <br />Ie <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />I <br />Ie <br /> <br />I <br /> <br />.P~ --100 l-~ ~~ ~qt-^-- fr/~t <br /> <br />, ~.--\e~.)~~-.SL ~ 1}J/t9- ~C~-('"J#'~ <br /> <br />"'PENDIX 6.2 W.., "',ki" .\~~ ~"'" <br /> <br /> <br />rackets indicate additions] qz:- r' ~ p <br /> <br />~ Colorado t of 1976-77 inflicted hardships on small rural towns and agricultural water users ~' <br />in Coiorado (Howe, Alexander and Moses 1982). Small towns experienced the greatest difficulties rJ <br />because of inadequate supply systems, exhaustion of groundwater, or inadequacies of water rights. :.1<' ""\ <br />In a number of cases, emergency supplies had to be provided by tank truck. The main lessons learned .-/'2iO <br />include: (1) that there are great variation in the conditions facing adjacent drainage basins, some 5' ~ . <br />having nearly normal supplies and others facing record low flows; and (2) that redistribution of <br />available supplies among agricultural users and between water suppliers (e.g. mutual ditch companies) <br />occurred frequently and served greatly to reduce drought damages. These findings point to the <br />desirability of decentralization of decision-making regarding reallocation of water to take advantage <br />of information on local conditions. Practices observed in Colorado in 1976-1978 which mitigated the <br />efforts of drought included those listed below [not included]. Most of these actions were locallv <br />initiated." [emphasis added] <br /> <br />2808 <br /> <br />/ <br /> <br /> <br /> <br />"Water banks require some physical factors to be in place: sufficient storage space such as reservoirs <br />or natural lakes and a reasonably extensive network of canals or stteams in order to facilitate transfers <br />among a large number of potential buyers and sellers over a sizeable area." <br /> <br />"Most recently, the California State Legislature has turned to the water bank as a way to mitigate <br />drought conditions. The enabling legislation allowed the governor to make emergency appropriations <br />for these types of requests [drought emergency responses]. In addition, no district is permitted to <br />purchase water if it is shown to be using resources inefficiently, or can not show a shortage of supplies <br />given current demand levels. The motivation for permanent improvements in water conservation thus <br />is absent. If farmers knew they could regularly get a good price for their water, they would be likely <br />to give up production of lower-valued crops and to undertake investments to increase water use <br />efficiency." <br /> <br />Howe (1992) developed several conclusions about water banking. Each of the water banks studied <br />had both positive aspects and some shortcomings. In the case of the 1977 California water bank, the <br />participants were limited to Federal and State agencies, thus excluding many potential buyers and <br />sellers, especially many farmers. On the other hand, prices were set according to buyers' and sellers' <br />marginal valuations of water, thus ensuring efficient transactions between those who did participate <br />in the water bank. <br /> <br />In the Snake River water bank, those who can participate include all contractors [buyers, under long- <br />term contract] of reservoir water in the region. The problem here is that water prices are not allowed <br />to vary to reflect market conditions in the region. In the California Water Bank of 1991, while the set <br />of permitted participants was much greater than under the 1976-77 bank, the fixed price is likely to <br />be inefficient. Refer to Table A6.2 for summarized data on water banks from Howe (1992). <br /> <br /> <br />As long as water banks are constrained in their operation from find g a <br />sellers are limited in their participation, water banks will not function <br />to Howe. <br /> <br />A6-5 <br />