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<br />" <br /> <br />~.i <br /> <br />Addressing the Basin's Problems <br /> <br />, ~;~'l <br />~.j <br />:'-, <br /> <br />;;., <br /> <br />resources. By citing them and discussing the potential merits of efforts <br />promoting cooperation, we are not saying such efforts necessarily will result <br />in the resolution or avoidance of disputes over the competition for the <br />resources. The best that such efforts can do is to provide a better forum <br />within which to deal with the conflicts that are inherent in the Basin. At <br />their heart, disputes over resources are nothing more or less than the forces <br />of economic competition at work. Efforts to increase cooperative <br />management of the Basin's resources can never be a substitute for <br />competition, but, when successful they help competitive forces work more <br />efficiently. <br /> <br />, <br />.., <br /> <br />C. Cooperative Outlook <br /> <br />~--. <br />~~ <br /> <br />As new demands for water and related resources have materialized in this <br />Basin, three types of response strategies have dominated. One is the <br />subsidized technological fix, which relies on outside monies to increase the <br />extraction of products from the ecosystem through steps, such as the <br />construction of dams to increase the supply of water in summer months, <br />levees to protect properties in floodplains, and logging roads to extend the <br />reach of sawmills. Another is political domination, with dominant political <br />groups forcing groups with marginal political or economic power, such as <br />Native Americans, to yield. The third is for established resources users to <br />hunker down and hope that the threat of competing demands will evaporate. <br /> <br />I >0 <br /> <br />There are some notable occasions where each of these strategies was <br />successful. Most attempts at a technological fix involve federal funding. The <br />BuRec's investments in the San Juan-Chama Project brought water from the <br />other side ofthe Continental Divide to insulate this Basin's water consumers <br />from supply limitations. These investments, together with those in the San <br />Luis Valley Closed Basin Project and low flow conveyance channel (LFCC) <br />have aimed at allowing upstream waters to meet their downstream <br />obligations by using "outside" water or reducing transportation "losses" <br />rather than confronting the political and economic difficulties of curtailing <br />consumption. <br /> <br />The interplay among dominant and vulnerable groups plays out in several <br />ways. Indian water rights remain largely undefined while newcomers' rights <br />are pressed forward. The residents of colonias and other low-income families <br />not connected to urban water systems continue to rely on water from wells <br />that may be contaminated. Residents of agricultural communities wonder <br /> <br />(, r 3 .~ . ,421 <br />\ '.,1 L~ _14 <br />