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OQOiM November 24,1922. But differences of opinion among the basin states were far from over. With the introduction of the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the controversy shifted to the halls of Congress and even- tually the Supreme Court. The Boulder Canyon Project Act Congressman Phil Swing and Senator Hiram Johnson were persistent men. They had to be to maneuver through Congress the Boulder Canyon Project Act after a drawn-out struggle that extended seven years. Three times the two California legislators intro- duced measures to autho- rize the legislation. Each time they were turned back as the seven basin states continued to bicker over the Colorado despite the compact they had signed. A fourth attempt was success- ful in 1928, notwithstanding considerable debate in the Senate, an Arizona fili- buster and survival of a joint resolution providing for a thorough investigation of the economic and engi- neering features of the pro- ject. The legislatures of six basin states had ratified the signed compact by early 1923. But Arizona had refused. And without ratifi- cation by all seven states, the compact wonid not become binding and obliga- tory. A series of events, extending from the time the first bill was introduced until the fourth was passed, saw one bill introduced reqniring ratification of the compact by only six states; .. the California Legislature linking its approval to Congress approving a reser- voir near Bonider Canyon; the upper basin states intro- ducing amendments to pro- tect their interests; the Utah Legislature backtracking and repealing its compact ratification; Arizona filibus- tering one bill into defeat; and finally California agree- ing to a limitation of 4.4 mil- lion acre-feet plus one-half of any surplus as its share of the water use allocated to the lower basin. The Senate approved the project on December 14, 1928, the House quickly fol- lowed and on December 21, President Calvin Coolidge signed it into law. Arizona refused to con- cede defeat and sought to have the Supreme Court declare the act unconstitu- tional. In May of the follow- ing year, the high court threw out the complaint. The way was clear to bnild what then was the world's biggest dam. And the way was paved to future use of the river's water. The Treaty It was almost like a seven- handed poker game and the pot sitting in the middle of the Uible was the water of the Colorado River. Since the early years of the 20th century, the seven basin states had been bluff- ing each other for shares of that pot. Sitting at the end of the table was an eighth play- er, Mexico, eager to join the game. Since 1929, the basin states had tried to give Mexico a minimum share of 750,000 acre-feet of water a year and keep the game seven-handed. That was the most water Mexico had to that point used in a single year, but officials south of the border demanded as much as 4.5 million acre- feet. Treaty negotiations col- CRWUA '1 " , lapsed. But the completion of Boulder Dam in 1935 and Parker Dam a few years later, bringing long- sought flood control along the lower river, resulted in the flourishing of Mexican agriculture. By 1941, Mexico was using 1.5 million acre-feet each year and its govern- ment was ready to negoti- ate again, this time playing one river against another. Most of the flow of the lower portion of the Rio Grande rises in Mexican tributaries and Texas farm- ers sought a treaty to pro- tect flourishing groves. Under a cloak of . wartime secrecy l the International Boundary and Water Commission began drafting a treaty ihat would cover both rivers. . The Mexican negotiating position was strengthened by the United States' need for a strong ally on its southern border. California, believing it stood to lose the most water if Mexico were guar- anteed a sizable entitle- ment of the Colorado, found itself standing alone in opposition to the treaty. Much of that water, it rea- soned,would come from . "surplus" flows described in the Colorado River Compact. The other basin states, fearful that Mexico would increase its demands in the future, though earlier hav- ing recommended consid- erably less, were willing to give up 1.5 million acre- feet. It was felt that amount would not jeopardize their entitlements. Texas Senator Tom Connally chaired the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which considered the treaty that was halIlll1ered out, a treaty that granted Mexico the water it wanted from the Colorado and gave Texas a favorable apportionment of the Rio Grande. California continued to obstruct final approval by the Senate for more than a year. It was a futile delaying action, and the Senate finally ratified the treaty by a 76-10 votein April 1945. Mexico approved the treaty in September;but the document carried a time bomb. The treaty made no provision for water quality. Sixteen years later, the bomb went off. In 1961, a canal to drain the increasingly salty water from the Wellton-Mohawk Valley in Arizona was com- pleted. But it dumped the water into the Colorado below the last point of . American use but above the MeXican point of diversion. The salinity of the river increased dramatically ,and Mexico bitterly complained that thousands of acres of its crops were being damaged. The two countries began negotiations even though the United States main- tained that the treaty had no water quality provision. In 1965, the United States agreed to build a neW drainage canal'that would. . carry the Weliton-Mohawk water to the international boundary. There Mexico could release it to the Gulf of California when it was the most saline or let it flow into the river when less salty. However, this solution proved inadequate and eight years later the United States agreed to deliver water of a quality satisfactory to Mexico. As a temporary measure, the canal would be extended to run all the way to the Gulf and all Wellton- Mohawk drainage water would be carried through it. Water would be released from U.S. storage reservoirs '2 -;