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<br />~ <br />~ <br />C'J <br />c-.J <br />( <br />c:.. <br /> <br /> <br />174 J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L. [Vol. 13 <br /> <br />vation because of additional costs.78 <br />State rules governing water districts also create barriers to water <br />reform. Some states restrict water trading outside the water district,78 <br />and several limit the length ofleases.80 The authorizing statutes of <br />federal projects may also place restrictions on water districts.81 <br />Even when there are not legal rules to restrict transfers, the <br />interests of water districts conflict with the objectives of water markets. <br />As bureaucracies, local water conservancy districts have interests and <br />policies similar to their larger federal counterpart, the Bureau of <br />Reclamation.82 Water district managers seek to protect their tax base <br />by controlling their water resources.88 Privatization of water rights, <br />as well as giving individual farmers the opportunity to transfer those <br />water rights, would significantly reduce the influence of these rent- <br />seeking agencies.... Water districts also fear that water markets would <br />cause the artificially low price of water to rise,88 A possible ulterior <br />motive for opposing water markets may be a district's belief that "a <br />water crisis can only lead to the construction of more aqueducts and <br />dams."'"' Nevertheless, this strategy-if it is a strategy--<:an backfire, <br />leading to conflicts with other water districts,87 Water districts may <br /> <br />Vaughan, Irri6ation Di8tricto: Ob.tack. to Water Marluti"8, AM. WATER WORKS Ass'N J., Mar. <br />1988, at 10. <br />'11 See Smith & Vaughan, 'UpM note 76. at 10. <br />TI New Mexico and Wyoming are two .tate. that have direct bans. See N.M. STAT. ANN. I <br />73.14-47(J) (Michia 1978); WYo. STAT. f 41-7-815 (1977). <br />10 Utah is one of the most restrictive states, limiting water leases to five years. UTAH CODE <br />ANN. f 17A.2.711 (1991). <br />11 WAHL, supra note 4, at 149-60. In addition, moat reclamation contracts require Bureau <br />approval for any water transfera. Gray 8t aI., .upra note 37. at 962. <br />a: See Gisser & Johnson, .upro note 75, at 158. Giaser'a and Johnson'. case study of New <br />MeDco's Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District (MRGCD) provides a useful illustration of the <br />bureaucratic reaJitiea. From 1961 to 1971axpenditures by the MRGCD grew by 65%, while the <br />number of acres irrigated remained constant. Tbe charge per acre for operation and <br />maintenance rose from $16.79 in 1961 to $33.90 in 1971. The MRGCD maintains control over <br />ita water resOur<:e8 by opposing attempts by individual. to lease or sell water outside the <br />District. Id, at 157-60. <br />.. [d. at 161 (attempts to control the water resource can lead to misallocation of that <br />resource). <br />14 ld. (water district managers and boards, depending upon the size and budgets of their <br />agencies, oppose transfers that directly threaten their tax base). <br />IS For example, Henry Vaux estimates that water markets would cause water prices to rile <br />IIom 33% to 500% in agricultural lOgjona of California. See Henry J. Vaw<, Jr., Economic <br />FactoT'tl Shapi"8 We.tern Water AI/ocation, 88 AM. J. AORIC. ECON. 1135, 1139-41 (1986). Vaux <br />notes however. that certain urban water prices might actually decrease. Id. at 1141. <br />.. Gray et aI., .upra note 87. at 982. <br />" SM Ruaaell Cleminga, W..thmd& Thi1'tlti"8 for More: Pleadi"8 Duperotion, 1M Valky'. <br />Large.t Water Diotrict Lay. Claim to Suppliu o(OtMr U..1'tI, FREsNo BEE, April 3, 1992, atAl. <br />~i. <br /> <br />"1 <br />t <br />, <br />, <br /> <br />:~ <br />~ <br />