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<br />001184
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<br />levee on the west bank, a 10.3-mile
<br />levee on the east bank, and a 5-mile
<br />channel improvement with a 2.3-mile
<br />cutoff to lead the river between the
<br />levees. It was begun by the U.S. Army
<br />Corps of Engineers in 1964, com-
<br />pleted in 1968, and cost $8 million in
<br />federal funds and $1 million in local
<br />dollars. It was intended to accommodate
<br />a flood of a magnitude that hypotheti-
<br />cally would occur only once in every 175
<br />years.
<br />It didn't, as time soon told. But
<br />meanwhile, everyone was very optimistic
<br />that it would: the Flood Control Dis-
<br />trict's president said, "This project
<br />will make many, many acres of valuable
<br />land secure for home, business, and
<br />industrial use"; a Major General of the
<br />Army Corps of Engineers said, "There is
<br />no reason why the project should not
<br />give indefinite protection from flooding
<br />to the area"; and the people started
<br />building, feeling secure in the protec-
<br />tion of the recent flood control project
<br />combined with the dam upstream (Fig.
<br />14).
<br />The local authorities did nothing to
<br />sto p them. Far from seeking to prevent
<br />floodplain encroachment, each local
<br />jurisdiction-Jackson on the west bank
<br />and Flowood, Richland, Pearl, and
<br />Rankin County to the east-did its ut-
<br />most to attract new development regard-
<br />less of flood hazard. An example: all of
<br />the land bordering the Pearl in Jackson
<br />was zoned residential or commercial; the
<br />Pearl and its local tributaries were not
<br />identified as constraining land use, nor
<br />was there any distinction between
<br />lands inside or outside the levee. On the
<br />east side of the river, land use manage-
<br />ment of the floodplain was lacking
<br />altogether. There, development both
<br />within and outside the levee proceeded
<br />without any zoning at all.
<br />
<br />There were a few minor cautions
<br />about floodplain development: (1) in its
<br />1973 F100d Plain Report, the Corps of
<br />Engineers did note that several northern
<br />Jackson subdivisions infringed on flood
<br />lands, but it did not go on to criticize
<br />Jackson's zoning law, and its tone about
<br />the unlikelihood of a major flood was
<br />generally complacent; (2) the Jackson
<br />city council did adopt a 1974 resolution
<br />that building permit applications should
<br />be reviewed for their consistency with
<br />the need to minimize flood damage and
<br />
<br />for recommended construction changes
<br />in flood hazard locations, but this resolu-
<br />tion was passed primarily to qualify
<br />Jackson for the "emergency phase" of
<br />the National F100d Insurance Program,
<br />and enforcement was by visual inspec-
<br />tion only; and (3) in 1978, the Central
<br />Mississippi Planning and Development
<br />District-the A-95 review agency for the
<br />region-did include in its general land
<br />plan for Rankin County the advice that
<br />the county should adopt zoning to re-
<br />strict inappropriate floodplain develop-
<br />ment, but the advice came late, has not
<br />been followed even yet, and was not
<br />similarly directed to municipalities of
<br />Pearl, Richland, and F1owood, who also
<br />needed it. All three acknowledgments
<br />of flood danger were simply token ges-
<br />tures: pebbles in the path of a surging
<br />tide.
<br />The Ross Barnett Dam likewise
<br />proved no defense against the '79 flood.
<br />Completed in the early 1960's, this dam
<br />at the northeast corner of Jackson was
<br />built by the then newly-organized five-
<br />county Water Supply District using local
<br />taxes and land sale revenues. It was in-
<br />tended mainly for water supply and rec-
<br />reation, although an ancillary purpose
<br />was to reduce downstream flooding by
<br />providing a modest storage capacity. It
<br />was not, however, a flood control proj-
<br />ect-to have served as such, its reservoir
<br />would have to have been kept at a level
<br />too low for maximum recreation use and
<br />shoreline development. With adequate
<br />flood warning, the level could have been
<br />dropped by phased releases to accommo-
<br />date arriving floodwaters. But three fed-
<br />eral agencies-the Corps, National
<br />Weather Service, and the U.S. Geological
<br />Survey-aIl gave different predictions of
<br />flood conditions, and all were too low.
<br />As a result, releases from the dam were
<br />too delayed to reduce the flood crest at
<br />Jackson very much.
<br />
<br />The 1979 Flood: Inundation and
<br />Mitigation
<br />
<br />The week before Easter in 1979 it
<br />started to rain. And it rained. By Thurs-
<br />day, April 12, Jackson was disrupted by
<br />local flash floods and the Pearl was rising
<br />ominously. By Sunday, they knew it was
<br />going way past the 1961 level, and the
<br />water continued to rise. It finally crested
<br />on Tuesday, April 17 , at 43.25 ft., with a
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