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<br />001184 <br /> <br />levee on the west bank, a 10.3-mile <br />levee on the east bank, and a 5-mile <br />channel improvement with a 2.3-mile <br />cutoff to lead the river between the <br />levees. It was begun by the U.S. Army <br />Corps of Engineers in 1964, com- <br />pleted in 1968, and cost $8 million in <br />federal funds and $1 million in local <br />dollars. It was intended to accommodate <br />a flood of a magnitude that hypotheti- <br />cally would occur only once in every 175 <br />years. <br />It didn't, as time soon told. But <br />meanwhile, everyone was very optimistic <br />that it would: the Flood Control Dis- <br />trict's president said, "This project <br />will make many, many acres of valuable <br />land secure for home, business, and <br />industrial use"; a Major General of the <br />Army Corps of Engineers said, "There is <br />no reason why the project should not <br />give indefinite protection from flooding <br />to the area"; and the people started <br />building, feeling secure in the protec- <br />tion of the recent flood control project <br />combined with the dam upstream (Fig. <br />14). <br />The local authorities did nothing to <br />sto p them. Far from seeking to prevent <br />floodplain encroachment, each local <br />jurisdiction-Jackson on the west bank <br />and Flowood, Richland, Pearl, and <br />Rankin County to the east-did its ut- <br />most to attract new development regard- <br />less of flood hazard. An example: all of <br />the land bordering the Pearl in Jackson <br />was zoned residential or commercial; the <br />Pearl and its local tributaries were not <br />identified as constraining land use, nor <br />was there any distinction between <br />lands inside or outside the levee. On the <br />east side of the river, land use manage- <br />ment of the floodplain was lacking <br />altogether. There, development both <br />within and outside the levee proceeded <br />without any zoning at all. <br /> <br />There were a few minor cautions <br />about floodplain development: (1) in its <br />1973 F100d Plain Report, the Corps of <br />Engineers did note that several northern <br />Jackson subdivisions infringed on flood <br />lands, but it did not go on to criticize <br />Jackson's zoning law, and its tone about <br />the unlikelihood of a major flood was <br />generally complacent; (2) the Jackson <br />city council did adopt a 1974 resolution <br />that building permit applications should <br />be reviewed for their consistency with <br />the need to minimize flood damage and <br /> <br />for recommended construction changes <br />in flood hazard locations, but this resolu- <br />tion was passed primarily to qualify <br />Jackson for the "emergency phase" of <br />the National F100d Insurance Program, <br />and enforcement was by visual inspec- <br />tion only; and (3) in 1978, the Central <br />Mississippi Planning and Development <br />District-the A-95 review agency for the <br />region-did include in its general land <br />plan for Rankin County the advice that <br />the county should adopt zoning to re- <br />strict inappropriate floodplain develop- <br />ment, but the advice came late, has not <br />been followed even yet, and was not <br />similarly directed to municipalities of <br />Pearl, Richland, and F1owood, who also <br />needed it. All three acknowledgments <br />of flood danger were simply token ges- <br />tures: pebbles in the path of a surging <br />tide. <br />The Ross Barnett Dam likewise <br />proved no defense against the '79 flood. <br />Completed in the early 1960's, this dam <br />at the northeast corner of Jackson was <br />built by the then newly-organized five- <br />county Water Supply District using local <br />taxes and land sale revenues. It was in- <br />tended mainly for water supply and rec- <br />reation, although an ancillary purpose <br />was to reduce downstream flooding by <br />providing a modest storage capacity. It <br />was not, however, a flood control proj- <br />ect-to have served as such, its reservoir <br />would have to have been kept at a level <br />too low for maximum recreation use and <br />shoreline development. With adequate <br />flood warning, the level could have been <br />dropped by phased releases to accommo- <br />date arriving floodwaters. But three fed- <br />eral agencies-the Corps, National <br />Weather Service, and the U.S. Geological <br />Survey-aIl gave different predictions of <br />flood conditions, and all were too low. <br />As a result, releases from the dam were <br />too delayed to reduce the flood crest at <br />Jackson very much. <br /> <br />The 1979 Flood: Inundation and <br />Mitigation <br /> <br />The week before Easter in 1979 it <br />started to rain. And it rained. By Thurs- <br />day, April 12, Jackson was disrupted by <br />local flash floods and the Pearl was rising <br />ominously. By Sunday, they knew it was <br />going way past the 1961 level, and the <br />water continued to rise. It finally crested <br />on Tuesday, April 17 , at 43.25 ft., with a <br /> <br />30 <br />